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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Richard J. Ansson, Jr.*

L Diversity Jurisdiction & Indian Nations
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed whether Indian
tribes are citizens of states for diversity jurisdiction purposes.' However, in
recent years a number of lower federal courts have addressed this issue, and
in so doing, have determined that Indian tribes are not citizens of states for
diversity purposes These holdings are important because they foreclose the
possibility of tribes suing or being sued under diversity jurisdiction in federal
court.
In 1972, the Second Circuit, in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida3 was the first court to address whether tribes were citizens of states
for diversity jurisdiction purposes.! In Oneida, the Oneida tribe of New York
and the Oneida tribe of Wisconsin sued two New York counties in New York
federal court alleging that the sale of tribal lands violated certain treaties.5
After the Oneida court had dismissed the tribes' claim of federal question
jurisdiction, the court evaluated the tribes' argument that the tribes were
citizens of a state for diversity jurisdiction purposes.6 In so doing, the Oneida
court determined that the Oneida tribe of New York was "surely not a citizen
of a state different from New York;" therefore, the court concluded that the
defeated
tribe's "lack of citizenship in a state other than New York ...
diversity jurisdiction."7
Two years later, the Eight Circuit, in Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v.
Dorgan,' addressed whether tribes were citizens of states for diversity

* Associate Professor of Law, The Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada at Las
Vegas. L.L.M., 1998, University of Missouri at Kansas City School of Law; J.D., 1997,
University of Oklahoma College of Law; B.A., 1994, University of Oklahoma.
1. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 317 n.286 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds, 1982).
2. See Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15 (2nd Cir. 1997); Gaines v. Ski Apache, 8 F.3d
726 (10th Cir. 1993); Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir.
1974); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916 (2nd Cir. 1972), rev'd and
remandedon other grounds,414 U.S. 661 (1974); Calvello v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 899 F. Supp.
431 (D.S.D. 1995); Weeder v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, 864 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
3. 464 F.2d 916 (2nd Cir. 1972), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 661
(1974).
4. Id. at 923.
5. Id. at 918-19.

6. Id. at 922-23.
7. Id. at 923 (emphasis added).
8. 505 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1974).
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jurisdiction purposes. In Standing Rock Sioux, the issue before the court
revolved around an action brought by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe against
the North Dakota Tax Commissioner for the recovery of state sales and use
taxes illegally collected from the tribe's members.' The Standing Rock Sioux
court held that the Eleventh Amendment10 barred the tribe from suing the
state." In so holding, the court explained that the Eleventh Amendment
prevented
the court from entertaining a monetary suit against a nonconsenting
12
state.
In an effort to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment, the tribe argued,
among other things, that it was not a citizen of any state, and therefore, it was
outside the reach of the Eleventh Amendment.'3 The court, citing the Second
Circuit's decision in Oneida, noted that "it is clear that an Indian tribe is not
a citizen of any state and cannot sue or be sued in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction."'4 Nevertheless, the Standing Rock Sioux court
concluded that this reasoning is not controlling because "different policy
decisions come into play" in Eleventh Amendment decisions. 5
Within the last ten years, a number of courts have considered whether
tribes are citizens of any state for diversity purposes.' 6 These courts, relying
on Standing Rock Sioux and Oneida, have all held that a tribe is not a citizen
of any state for diversity purposes, and therefore, determined that a tribe can
not sue or be sued in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. 7 For
example, in Romanella v. Hayward," a cashier of a tribal casino, domiciled
in Rhode Island, brought a personal injury action in federal court against
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation of Connecticut, and the district court, in
dismissing the suit, held that Indian tribes are not citizens of any state and
cannot be sued in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. 9 The Second
Circuit affirmed the decision and, in so doing, stressed that an Indian tribe is
not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes."

9. Id. at 1137.

10. The 11th Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State or by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
11. Standing Rock Sioux, 505 F.2d at 1138.
12. id.
13. Id. at 1140.
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 1141.
16. See infra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 2.
18. 114 F.3d 15 (2nd Cir. 1997).
19. 933 F. Supp. 163, 165-67 (D. Conn. 1996).
20. Romanella, 114 F.3d at 15-16.
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Similarly, in Gaines v. Ski Apache,2 the Tenth Circuit also held that
Indian tribes are not citizens of any state for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. In Gaines, the plaintiff, a resident of Texas, was forbidden
from bringing a diversity suit against a ski resort owned and operated by the
Mescalero Apache Tribe of New Mexico.' As a result, the plaintiff was
unable to recover for injuries he had received when he had been struck in the
back of the head by a chairlift.'
Finally, in Calumet Gaming Group Kansas v. Kickapoo,u a federal district
court in the Tenth Circuit also held that a tribe is not a citizen of any state for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. In Calumet, a gaming consultant brought
an action against the Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas for breach of its consulting
agreement and for failure to repay its loan.27 However, since tribes are not
citizens for diversity purposes, the federal court was unable to exercise
diversity jurisdiction and was forced to dismiss the claim.'
1. The Navajo Nation's Aneth Extension & The Utah Navajo Trust Fund
The Navajo Nation's Aneth Extension is a 52,000-acre tract of land, located
in southeastern Utah, that was added to the Navajo Nation by a congressional
act in 1933." Under the act, Congress provided that if oil and gas were
found on the Aneth Extension, the State of Utah would receive 37.5% of the
royalties to be administered on behalf of the Aneth Extension residents for the
"payment of the tuition of Indian children in white schools, and/or the
building or maintenance of roads across the lands . . . for the benefits of
Indians [residing on the Aneth Extension]."" In 1968, Congress amended the
1933 Act by enlarging the class of recipients entitled to benefits to all Utah
Navajos, and by requiring that Utah use the royalty proceeds to provide "for

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

8 F.3d 726 (10th Cir. 1993).
Id at 729.
Id.
Id.
987 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Kan. 1997).
Id. at 1324.
Id

28. Id.
29. For a discussion of the Navajo Nation's Aneth Extension, see Richard I. Ansson, Jr., The
Navajo Nation's Aneth Extension and the Utah Navajo Trust Fund: Who Should Govern the Fund
After Years of Misuse, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 555 (1997) [hereinafter Ansson, Navajo Nation's
Aneth Extension]; see also Richard J.Ansson, Jr., Protecting Profits Derived from Tribal
Resources: Why the State of Utah Should Not Have the Power to Tax Non-Indian Oil and Gas
Lessees on the Navajo Nation's Aneth Extension: Texaco, Exxon, and Union Oil v. San Juan
County School District- A Case Study, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 329 (1997).
30. See Act of Mar. 1, 1933, ch. 160, 47 Stat. 1418, 1418-19 (as amended by Pub. L. No.
90-306, 82 Stat. 121 (1968)).
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the health, education, and general welfare of the Navajo Indians residing in
San Juan County."'"
During the middle 1950s, plentiful amounts of oil and gas were discovered
on the Aneth Extension.' Between 1960 and 1990, the State of Utah's
records disclosed that the state received $61 million in royalty proceeds.
However, the state failed to spend the monies on behalf of the Utah Navajos
and has subsequently confessed that it recklessly squandered $52 million.'
In 1991, five Utah Navajos filed a class-action lawsuit against the state of
Utah for breach of its duties as the trust's fiduciary." The Utah Navajos,
which number around 7500, are claiming $100 million in damages because
their experts estimate that if the state of Utah had properly managed the fund,
the trust should have grown to over $100 million.'
In Pelt & the Navajo Nation v. Utah,7 the federal district court, per Judge
David Sam, held that the beneficiaries could not maintain a cause of action
against the State of Utah because the 1933 and 1968 Acts did not create a
m
private cause of action.
' In 1996, the 10th Circuit reversed this holding and
remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings." In so
doing, the 10th Circuit found that the Utah Navajo's could assert a breach of
fiduciary claim.'
In early April 1999, the federal district court, per Judge David Sain, held
that the Utah Navajos may proceed with their breach of fiduciary trust claim
against the State of Utah.41 The State of Utah had asserted that its liability,
if any, "should be governed by the state's own statute of limitations, or
extending only as far back as 1988."' However, the district court held that
the state's statute of limitations would not govern.43 As a result, the court's
decision opens the possibility for a massive judgment if the Utah Navajos can
prove mismanagement."
Mismanagement of the fund should be fairly easy to prove. Indeed, as
early as 1961, the Utah Navajos sued the State of Utah for improper use of

31. Id.
32. See Florence Williams, Utah Freezes Navajo Trust Fund as Report Details Scandal;
American Indians: An Audit Alleges State, as Trustee, Looked the Other Way as Oil Royalty
Trust Account Was Plundered,L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 12, 1992, at A1S.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Paul Foy, Navajos Claim Utah Wasted $100M,SEATrLE TIMS, Apr. 8,1999, at A8.
36. Id.
37. 104 F.3d 1534 (10th Cir. 1996).
38. Id. at 1540.
39. Id at 1545.
40. i'd. at 1544.
41. Foy, supra note 35,at A8,

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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funds in Sakezzie v. Utah Indian Affairs Commission.' At this time, the
State had already made numerous improper expenditures including: a $78,000
expenditure to pipe water to a white man; a $27,000 expenditure for an
airport; a $7750 payment to commission employees; a $3990 expenditure to
pay employees' travel expenses; and a $347 expenditure to pay for employees'
telephone calls, printing, and incidental expenses. The Sakezzie court held,
among other things, that the State of Utah must use the fund for authorized
purposes only" Two years later, the Utah Navajos again brought suit against
Utah for the state's failure to expend the monies on the beneficiaries behalf,
and the court once again reiterated the State's trusteeship role." In response,
the State claimed that it was spending the funds as discerningly as possible.
For the next thirty years, the State of Utah continued to mismanage the
fund. During this period, the Utah Navajos brought suit in the mid-1970s
alleging that the state of Utah mismanaged their royalty proceeds.' The suit
was terminated after the State agreed to give an accounting of how the funds
were spent." In the years after this suit, however, the funds collected never
reached the Utah Navajos. In 1991, an audit revealed:
[The Utah Navajo Fund was used by various individuals for
personal use. These individuals used the funds to purchase new
cars, finance businesses that failed, pay credit card debts, grant
cash bonuses, and employ family members. The audit also
revealed that the State had spent money on various enterprises
that failed shortly after opening. The State had revealed that it
had opened a tribal boat marina at Lake Powell, a shopping mall
in West Jordan, and a government social services office seventy
miles off the reservation. Finally, the audit revealed that the State
had used certain royalty proceeds to build a garment factory in
New Mexico that never opened
In the current suit, Utah will have to provide a complete accounting of the
monies received or earned by the Navajo Trust Fund." Fortunately, previous
suits brought by the Navajos will help document the State's utter failure to
expend the trust fund monies on behalf of the Utah Navajos. The Assistant
Attorney General of Utah has asserted that Utah should only be liable for its

45. 198 F. Supp. 218 (D. Utah 1961).
46. Id. at 220-221
47. kL at 224.
48. Sakezzie v. Utah State Indian Affairs Comm'n, 215 F. Supp. 12, 14-16 (D. Utah 1963).
49. Id.
50. Bigman v. Utah Navajo Development Council, Inc., No. C-77-0031, slip. op. at 4 (D.
Utah, Sept. 25, 1978).

51. Id.
52. Ansson, Navajo Nation's Aneth Extension, supra note 29, at 585-86.
53. Foy, supra note 35, at A8.
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failure to appropriate monies for reservations roads, health care, and
education." However, the Navajos have maintained that the State of Utah
should be accountable for its failure to invest the trust funds, which Navajo
experts claim should have grown to over $100 million'
In this author's estimation, the State of Utah should be liable for $100
million based upon Utah's utter neglect of the Utah Navajo's. Essentially, the
Utah Navajos own the dubious distinction of being the poorest residents in the
State of Utah and in the Navajo Nation. ' Even today, many homes do not
have running water or electricity." In evaluating the poverty of the Utah
Navajos, one commentator recently found:
The 20th century has come to the Navajo Nation in uneven
strides. Comfortable manufactured homes dot the reservation,
with nice cars and pickups parked nearby. Yet running water and
telephones are scarce on this desert of canyons and mesas in
southeastern Utah. Less than a year from the 21st century, the last
residents are getting electricity. For those who live by the light of
kerosene lamps and keep food in coolers, the coming of power
lines is life-changing.'
Unfortunately, these conditions should not have been allowed to remain
this long - after all the State of Utah has received an abundant amount of
monies from the trust fund which should have been used by the State on these
residents behalf. Hopefully, in light of the most recently legal developments,
the Utah Navajos may finally receive their trust fund monies, and hopefully,
these monies will be used on their behalf.
III. State Taxation of Non-Indian Contractorsand Blaze Construction Co.
Blaze Construction Company was incorporated under the laws of the
Blackfeet Tribe of Oregon.? Starting in the mid-1980s, Blaze Construction
Company contracted with the Bureau of Indian Affairs to provide road-paving,
grading, drainage, overlayment, marking, and bridge-building services on a
number of Indian reservations in a number of different states.'a Blaze was

54. ld.

55. Id.
56. Florence Williams, Utah Freezes Navajo Trust Fund as Report Details Scandal;
American Idians: An Audit Alleges State, as Trustee, Looked the Other Way as Oil Royalty
Trust Account Was Plundered,LA. TIMEs, Jan. 25 1992, at AI.
57. Phil Sahm, IsolatedNavajos Finally Flipthe Switch on Eve of21st Century,Power Lines
Begin to Change Lives in Remote Areas, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 21, 1999, at Al.
58. Id.
59. Blaze Constr. Co. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 884 P.2d 803, 804 (1994),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1016 (1995).
60. See Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 947 P.2d 836, 837 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1997), r-vd, 119 S. Ct. 957 (1999).
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not only required to hire local reservation Indians to work on each project, but
it was also required to plan the developments with local reservation

officials.6' The states in which these reservations were located did not
participate or regulate any aspect with regard to these infrastructure
improvements." Finally, the road-improvement projects were solely funded
with Federal Highway Administration Funds.'

Beginning in the late 1980s, Arizona and New Mexico imposed their
nondiscriminatory taxes on Blaze Construction Company." The states alleged

that Blaze Construction Company was a federal government contractor subject
to state taxes under United States v. New Mexico.' In United States v. New

Mexico, the United States Supreme Court held that the state may tax private
or corporate entities that contract with the federal government.' Here, since
Blaze contracted with the BIA, Arizona and New Mexico assumed that they
could tax this corporate entity under United States v. New Mexico. 7
Blaze Construction Company argued that it was not subject to state taxes

because the Indian preemption doctrine preempted the imposition of state
taxes. ' Under the doctrine of federal regulatory preemption if the subject

matter is a non-Indian activity within a reservation, the Supreme Court held
in Williams v. Lee" that the state has power within the reservation unless

such power violates either a governing act of Congress or interferes with the
tribes right of self-government." Several years later, the Supreme Court held
in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission7' that if the subject matter is

Indian and within an Indian reservation, then the state has no power, and that

61. See Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Protecting Tribal Sovereignty: Why States Should Not Be
Able to Tax ContractorsHired by the BIA to Construct Reservation ProjecL for Tribes: Blaze
Construction Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department: A Case Study, 20 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 459 (1995-96) [hereinafter Ansson, Protecting Tribal Sovereignty].
62. See, e.g., Blaze, 947 P.2d at 837. For example, the Blaze court found:
The State of Arizona did not participate in planning or developing any of Blaze's
projects on reservations in Arizona. It issued no permits. It provided no inspection
services related to employment, construction, quality or safety. It provided no
maintenance or regular law-enforcement services on any of the reservation roads
on which Blaze worked.
Id.
63. Id.
64. See Blaze, 947 P.2d at 837-38; Blaze Constr. Co. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue
Dep't, 884 P.2d 803, 805 (N.M. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1359 (1995).
65. 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982).
66. Id. at 734.
67. See supra note 65.
68. See, e.g., Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 947 P.2d 836 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1997), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 957 (1999).
69. 358 U.S. 214 (1959).
70. Id. at 216-19.
71. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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power may only be obtained in a way specified by Congress 2 Here, Blaze
Construction Company, a nonmember Indian company, is considered to be a
non-Indian for federal regulatory preemption purposes; and hence, Blaze
falls within the guise of the Williams v. Lee test. Under the Williams v. Lee
test, the Supreme Court in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Board of
Revenue4 and White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracketr5 held that the
preemption doctrine held that the preemption doctrine should apply whenever
the tribe directly contracts with the non-member Indian or non-Indian
contractor 6
In 1986, the New Mexico taxation department levied a nondiscriminatory
gross receipts tax on Blaze. Blaze brought suit and argued that the preemption
doctrine should preempt the tax. The New Mexico Court of Appeals agreed
with Blaze, and in so doing, rejected the Department's argument that Blaze
was a federal government contractor subject to state taxes under United States
v. New Mexico." The Department appealed, and the New Mexico Supreme
Court reversed, holding first that the state could tax Blaze under United States
v. New Mexico and second that federal law did not preempt the imposition of
the state tax.7 The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied
certiorari, and as a result, Blaze was required to pay the state of New
Mexico's gross receipts tax.'
In 1993, the Arizona taxation department issued a tax assessment of
contracting privileges taxes against Blaze for the audit period of June 1, 1986,
through August 31, 1990.' The Arizona Court of Appeals for Taxation, the
final court of appeal for taxation issues, held that federal law preempted the
imposition of the state tax' The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and held that Blaze would be subject to state taxation under United
States v. New Mexico.'

72. Id. at 173.
73. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
74. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
75. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
76. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 838-39; Bracker, 448 U.S. at 152.
77. Blaze Construction Co. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 871 P.2d 1368, 1369
(N.M. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 884 P.2d 803 (N.M. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1359 (1995).
78. Blaze Construction Co. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 884 P.2d 803 (N.M.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1359 (1995). For a thorough discussion of this case, see Ansson,
ProtectingTribal Sovereignty, supra note 61.
79. Blaze Construction Co. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 115 S. Ct. 1359
(1995).
80. Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 947 P.2d 836, 837 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997),
rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 957 (1999).

81. Id. at 846.
82. Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 119 S. Ct. 957, 960-61 (1999).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol24/iss1/19

No. 1]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Interest balancing in this setting would only cloud the clear rule
established by our decision in New Mexico. The need to avoid
litigation and to ensure efficient tax administration counsels in
favor of a bright-line standard for taxation of federal contracts,
regardless of whether the contracted-for activity takes place on
Indian reservations.'
Hence, under the Court's holding, all contracts between the BIA and nonIndian parties will be subjected to nondiscriminatory state taxes. The Court
went on to explain that this does not undermine tribal governmental
development because the federal government, not the tribe, had contracted
for services.U The irony in this result is that Blaze was required to work
with each individual tribe to plan and develop each tribe's respective
infrastructure - all the BIA did was initiate the contract. Consequently, the
United States Supreme Court's holding does undermine tribal governmental
development. Nevertheless, in light of this holding, tribes will have to
contract with non-Indian parties before courts will employ the preemption
doctrine.

83. Id.
84. Id.
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